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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LOUIE E. SIMS,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v,

:

COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

:

Case No. 900324

Category No. 15

Respondent/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah
State Tax Commission.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(e)(ii) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue properly before the Court for review is
whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in a drug
stamp tax proceeding before the Utah State Tax Commission.
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction
of error" standard of review applies.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct.
120 (1990); Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 76$ P.2d 455, 456 (Utah
1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Louie E. Sims, was served by the Utah State
Tax Commission with a notice and demand for the payment of tax
due as a result of petitioner's failure "to obtain the official
stamps, labels or other indica [sic] required and defined by
Title 59-19-103, known as Illegal Drug Stamp Act" (R. 257).
Petitioner filed a petition for redetermination of the
tax assessment, and a formal hearing before the Tax Commission
was scheduled (R. 41-44, 132). After the hearing, the Tax
Commission affirmed the tax assessment against petitioner (R. 812) •
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A lengthy recitation of the facts underlying the
seizure of controlled substances which led to the tax assessment
against petitioner is not necessary to the resolution of the
single issue this Court should address on appeal.

The parties

stipulated to the following pertinent facts:
1.

The tax was imposed as a result of a
seizure of drugs from Sims' vehicle on
or about July 27, 1988.

2.

The drugs were determined to be cocaine
and mari j uana.

3.

There was no evidence that drug stamps
had been attached to those substances.

4.

Sims did not purchase drug stamps.

-2-

5.

The tax involved is an illegal drug

stamp

tax

in the amount of $197,053

and

penalty of $197,053 assessed on August
30, 1988, by the State Tax Commission.
(R. 144-45).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Tax Commission was correct in refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule to an Illegal Drug Stamp Tax proceeding.
tax and penalty are civil.

The

The administrative hearing before the

Commission was a purely civil proceeding.
Analysis of the history and development of the
judicially created rule, in both federal and state courts,
reveals that it has been primarily applied to criminal
proceedings where its deterrent effect is likely to be served.
When applied to civil matters, application has been limited to
instances where the deterrence of unlawful conduct can be
achieved.

In this case, Tax Commission agents did not direct or

participate in the seizure of the illegal drugs on which the tax
is based.

The Commission has no authority to affect the actions

of law enforcement agencies.

The rule should not be extended to

this non-criminal administrative hearing, where there can be no
deterrent effect on possible "unlawful conduct" of law
enforcement agents.
Petitioner's argument that the deterrence goal of the
exclusionaryy rule would be fulfilled in light of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-16-105(6) (Supp. 1990) (tax proceeds sharing provision) is
not applicable here.

This statutory provision was not effective

in 1988, when the taxes were assessed against the Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
Petitioner has raised eight issues on appeal.

Seven of

the eight issues relate to the legality of the roadblock at which
he was stopped and the search of his vehicle conducted at that
roadblock pursuant to his consent.

Although these issuers were

raised by petitioner below, the Tax Commission did not rule on
them because it concluded that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to civil tax proceedings.
Given the Tax Commission's ruling regarding the
exclusionary rule, this Court should address only the propriety
of that ruling.

If the Court were to conclude that the

exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings before the Tax
Commission, the legality of the roadblock and the consent search
would be irrelevant.

On the other hand, if the Court were to

reach a contrary conclusion, the matter should be remanded to the
Tax Commission for a determination of the exclusion question.
Such a procedure would be appropriate in light of the fact that
the roadblock and consent search issues have been presented to
the Utah Court of Appeals in a pending appeal from petitioner's
criminal conviction of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute.

State v. Sims, No. 890463-CA.

If the tax

matter were remanded to the Commission by this Court, the
Commission would in all likelihood have the benefit of the court
of appeals' decision on the search and seizure issues.
In sum, this Court should address only one of the eight
issues raised by petitioner:

Does the exclusionary rule apply in

a drug stamp tax poceeding before the Tax Commission?
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Assuming

they become relevant, the search and seizure issues are better
resolved in the appeal from petitioner's criminal conviction and
in the first instance by the Tax Commission,

The State will

therefore limit its argument in this brief to the issue of the
exclusionary rule's application.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TAX COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO
APPLY THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO ILLEGAL DRUG
STAMP TAX APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.
A-

The Administrative Hearing Before tne Commission
Was a Civil Proceeding.

Central to this issue is whether the penalties for
violation of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 5919-101 et seq. ("the Stamp Act") are civil or criminal.

Rules of

statutory construction and case law establish that the tax and
penalty provisions of the Act are civil.

The Act clearly implies

separate civil and criminal penalties.
A purely civil tax on illegal activities is common.
For instance, gains from illegal transactions, such as
bootlegging, gambling, extortion, or fraud are included in gross
income under the Internal Revenue Code.

The application of a

tax on income from illegal sources does not change the civil

See United State v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (gains from
illegal gambling activities are taxable income); E.C. James, 366
U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled funds are to be included in gross
income of the embezzler in the year in which the funds are
embezzled); and G.D. Wood, 693 F.Supp. 452 (1988) (taxpayer was
required to pay income taxes on income received from illegal drug
activities even though all proceeds from illegal drug
transactions were eventually forfeited to the government).

nature of the taxing process-

Likewise, a tax assessed upon an

illegal substance does not convert the nature of the tax from
civil to criminal.
The Stamp Act clearly defines a tax and establishes a
100% penalty on any of these unpaid taxes.

This is a civil

penalty which is assessed and collected as part of the tax.

Utah

Code Ann. § 59-19-106(1) (Supp. 1990).
The subsection immediately following states: "In
addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or
possessing marihuana or controlled substances without affixing
the appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a
third degree felony and is subject to a fine of not more than
$10,000 . . . ."

§ 59-19-106(2) (emphasis added).

If the

legislature had intended the entire statute to impose either a
civil or criminal penalty, it would not have distinguished
between the two.

Thus, the legislature clearly expressed a

separate civil tax and penalty assessment.
In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that a penalty imposed on persons discharging
hazardous substances into navigable waters was a civil penalty,
stating that the question of whether a penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction.
accepted the congressional label of "civil".

The Court

It said:

Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally
proceeded on two levels. First, we have set
out to determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism,
indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other.
Second, where Congress has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, we
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have inquired further whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate that intention. In
regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted
that "only the clearest proof could suffice
to establish the unconstitutionality of a
statute on such a ground.'1
Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
Further, the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act is not so
punitive in nature as to negate the civil penalties-

The Supreme

Court in Ward, referring to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S,
144 (1963), reaffirmed the seven factors, previously established,
that have "prove[n] helpful in . . . consideration of similar
questions . . . ."

Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.

These seven factors

are:
[1 ]
Whether
the
sanction
involves
an
affirmative disability or restraint,
[2]
whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment,
[3] whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment — retribution and deterrence,
[5]
whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime,
[6] whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for* it, and
[7] whether it
appears excessive in relation to the inquiry,
and may often point in differing directions.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-9 (emphasis in original,
footnotes omitted).
When these factors are applied, it is clear that the
Stamp Act is civil in nature.

The Supreme Court has declared

that where both a civil and criminal penalty are found in the
same statute, that fact dilutes the force of an argument that the
civil penalty is really a criminal penalty.

Ward 448 U.S. at 250

(discussing Halverinq v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (a 50%
penalty for tax fraud was held to be civil)).

There is no case law in support of the proposition that
payment of a stamp tax has historically been viewed as a form of
criminal punishment.

The traditional aims of criminal

punishment, retribution and deterrence, are not served by the
Stamp Act.

The Act imposes statutorily fixed taxes and penalties

on specific substances.
1990),

See Utah Code Ann, § 59-19-103 (Supp.

These taxes are not affected by a criminal conviction.

The behavior to which the penalty applies is a violation of the
Stamp Act or, in other words, a failure to acquire and affix the
required stamps.

This behavior becomes a crime only when the

felony and fine aspect of Utah Code Ann, § 59-19-106(2) (Supp.
1990) is applied.

The application of the felony and fine aspect

is not within the jurisdiction of the Tax Commission.

The tax is

imposed upon a substance and is not related to a criminal
conviction.
The alternative purpose assigned to the civil penalty
clearly is not excessive.

The South Dakota Supreme Court was

faced with a similar question in determining whether a $750.00
civil penalty was excessive for possession of less than one ounce
of marijuana.

See State v. Barber, 427 N.W.2d 375 (S.D. 1988).

That court reasoned:
[W]e find that the civil penalty . . . [for
possession of marijuana] is not so clearly
excessive as to bear no relationship to the
purpose for which it is imposed. Drug abuse
is a peril to society and particularly to our
youth. The costs to society in terms of the
health and mental well-being and lost
potential of young people involved in such
activity are incapable of estimation.
Further, in attempting to curb drug abuse,
society is required to expend ever increasing
financial resources in law enforcement and
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drug awareness and prevention campaigns.
civil penalty . . . for possession of
marijuana is of but little recompense to
society for those costs.

The

Id. at 377.
For these reasons, the Court should conclude that the
Act's civil penalties are not criminal in nature.

Thus, the

hearing before the Commission was a civil proceeding.

B.

The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply To A
Civil Proceedingr And Its Application Would
Be Incorrect In This Case,

The relief sought by petitioner, namely application of
the exclusionary rule to Commission proceedings, is inconsistent
with the history and development of the rule on both the state
and federal level.

Its application in this case would not

further the purpose of the rule.
1.

History and Development of the Exclusionary
Rule in Federal and Utah Courts.

Prior to the rule's creation, courts would not suppress
pertinent evidence, even though illegally obtained.
New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904).

See Adams v.

This changed when the

exclusionary rule was announced in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).

The Court reasoned that without this judicial

protection the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures would become meaningless.

_Id. at 393.

However, because Weeks was not then binding on the
states, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected its application
to state court proceedings.

State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P.

704, 708 (1923); see also State v. Fair, 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P-2d

615 (1960).

The Utah Court reasoned that this constitutional

right would be protected by subjecting the individual conducting
the unreasonable search and seizure "to all consequences and
penalties provided by law."

Aime, 220 P. at 707.

This rationale

was directly contrary to the federal rule that was not directed
at "individual misconduct" but at illegally obtained evidence.
However, Utah's independence in this area came to an
end when the Supreme Court announced that the exclusionary rule
would be binding on state courts.
(1961).

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

The basis of that decision was that the exclusionary

rule would protect the "imperative of judicial integrity" by
compelling the government to comply with the "charter of its own
existence."

Id., at 658-59 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364

U.S. 206, 222 (I960)).

In a later case, the Court made clear

that "[j]udicial integrity clearly does not mean that the courts
must never admit evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment."

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35

(1976) .
The Utah Supreme Court was thus compelled to apply the
rule it had expressly rejected in Aime.

See State v. Jasso, 439

P.2d 844 (Utah 1979) .
The earlier rationale of "the imperative of judicial
integrity," was later eclipsed by a policy of deterrence.

In

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court specified
that "[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule then
is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth
Amendment Rights."

Ld. at 486.

The Court restricted application
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of the rule "to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served."

^d. at 487-88 (quoting

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)); see also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08, 918-19 (1984).
In a corresponding footnote, the Court quoted a noted
criminal law commentator:

"[T]he rule is a needed, but

grud[g]ingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed
than is needed to combat the disease.

Granted that so many

criminals must go free as will deter the constables from
blundering, pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the
confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on the public
interest."

Stone 428 U.S. at 487 n.24 (quoting Amsterdam,

Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa.L.Rev.
378, 388-89 (1964)).
Thus, the judiciary designed the exclusionary rule to
deter future unlawful conduct of law enforcement officers.

The

rule is properly applied in instances where its deterrent purpose
is likely to be served.
2.

Application of the Exclusionary Rule to
Civil Matters in Federal Cases.

In United States v. Janis, the Supreme Court was asked
to apply the exclusionary rule to a tax proceeding.

There, the

police obtained a warrant to search Janis's residence for
bookmaking paraphernalia.
were seized.

Id. at 434.

Cash and wagering records

A police officer informed the IRS of these records.

Based on this information, Janis was assessed wagering taxes.
Id. at 437.

The IRS levied on Janis's cash that had been seized

by the police.

A subsequent state criminal action was brought, and the
court suppressed the evidence seized by the police-

The court

ordered all items returned except the cash levied by the IRS.
Id. at 437-38.

Janis filed for a refund of the Ccish.

After the

IRS denied the request, Janis filed an action in federal district
court which sought suppression of all evidence from which the
assessment had been made.
The Supreme Court held "that the judicially created
exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the
civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a
criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign."
459-60.

The Court expressly stated:

JA.

at

"In the complex and

turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to
exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."
at 447 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).

Id.

The Court expressly

left open the question of the rule's application where
2
"intrasovereign" violations have taken place.
Rl. at 456.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court weighed the
"likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police . . .
[against] the societal costs imposed by the exclusion . . . ."
Id. at 454.

The Court reasoned that "the deterrent effect of the

exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the
'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement
officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or

The court stated: "[T]he seminal cases that apply the
exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve "intrasovereign"
violations, [] a situation we need not consider here." Janis,
428 U.S. at 456 (footnote omitted).
-12-

against a different sovereign."

Ld. at 458.

The Court went on

to state:
This attenuation, coupled with the existing
deterrence effected by the denial of use of
the evidence by either sovereign in the
criminal trials with which the searching
officer is concerned, creates a situation in
which the imposition of the exclusionary rule
sought in this case is unlikely to provide
significant, much less substantial additional
deterrence. It falls outside the offending
officer's zone of primary interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court decided that the societal costs imposed by
the rule were too severe because "the enforcement of admittedly
valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary
rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, the
concededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered
unavailable."

.Id. at 447.

In petitioner's case, county law enforcement officers
brought a criminal action against Sims.

As a result of the

criminal charges arising out of the possession of the controlled
substances, the district court ruled that the search of the
petitioner's vehicle was lawful (R. at 9 ) . These law enforcement
officers were not under the control of the Commission, nor does
the Commission have any authority to control their activities.
The relationship of county law enforcement officers and Utah
Highway Patrol officers to the Utah State Tax Commission is
extremely attenuated.

An application of the exclusionary rule to

tax proceedings is unlikely to effect the deterrent purpose of
the rule because tax law enforcement is well outside the
arresting officers' zone of primary interest.

In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the
Supreme Court addressed the issue it had expressly left open in
Janis:

whether the exclusionary rule applied in a civil case

involving intrasovereign violations.

There, Lopez-Mendoza

challenged the deportation ordejr of an immigration judge because
his alien status had come to the attention of officials of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by illegal means.
Id. at 1034.

The Court found that a "deportation proceeding is a

purely civil action . . . ," id. at 1038, although it "is a civil
complement to a possible criminal prosecution . . . ."
1042.

Id. at

The immigration judge could not "adjudicate guilt or

punish . . . for any crime related to unlawful entry into or
presence in this country.

Consistent with the civil nature of

the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of
a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing."

_Id. at

1038.
The Court, in applying the balancing test of Janis,
concluded that exclusion would not deter the INS from Fourth
Amendment violations because of a comprehensive scheme by the INS
to prevent this type of conduct.

3x1. at 1046.

On the other side

of the equation, the Court found that the social cost was "both
unusual and significant."

Id..

It stated that ongoing violations

of immigration law would occur, that the streamlined deportation
hearing would become cumbersome, and that administration of the
exclusionary rule by the Board of Immigration Appeals would
become costly.

Rl. at 1048-49.

Thus, the Court found the

exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil cases involving
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intrasovereign violations where the balancing test of Janis is
satisfied*
The Second Circuit in Tirado v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307 (2nd Cir. 1982), considered
whether evidence allegedly seized unlawfully by federal narcotics
officers for use in a criminal trial was also barred by the
exclusionary rule in a subsequent federal tax proceeding-

The

court concluded that the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary
rule is not served by applying the rule to exclude evidence from
a proceeding where the evidence was not seized with the
participation or collusion of, or in contemplation of use by,
agents responsible for the proceeding in which the evidence is
presented•

The court held that the rule was inapplicable in the

tax proceeeding.
The Lopez-Mendoza and Tirado cases are substantially
similar to this appeal.

The tax proceedings conducted before an

administrative body with limited jurisdiction are separate from
possible criminal prosecutions held before a court with proper
criminal jurisdiction.

The Tax Commission cannot adjudicate

guilt or impose criminal sanctions.

Additionally, it cannot

guide or direct the efforts of law enforcement personnel, nor can
it correct any conduct by law enforcement personnel which may be
violative of constitutional rights.

The courts in the cases

discussed above concluded that exclusion of evidence in these
proceedings would not deter Fourth Amendment violations by the
agency in its investigation of possible criminal activity.
Petitioner's case is analogous.

Application of the rule to tax

proceedings would not achieve any deterrent effect.

It would be

inappropriate to apply criminal, protections to these purely civil
tax proceedings.
3.

Application of the Exclusionary Rule by
State Courts,

This Court has never articulated a state exclusionary
rule for civil administrative cases.

It should not extend the

exclusionary rule to administrative proceedings before the Tax
Commission.
Other state courts have rejected the application of the
rule in civil proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Virginia in

County of Henrico v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1989), held:
"[T]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be extended
from criminal cases to civil cases."

3Jd. at 462.

That court

reasoned that deterrence is not served by the rule because no
empirical proof exists as to its effectiveness.

The court

further rejected the rule because it renders reliable and
probative evidence unavailable; it deflects the truth-finding
process; and it risks engendering disrespect for law by promoting
procedure above the fundamental search for truth and justice.
Id.
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Green v. Director of
Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818 (Mo.App. 1988), held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings for
revocation of a driver's license.

In that case the Director of

Revenue conceded that the stop which resulted in Green's arrest
for intoxication was unlawful.

Green refused to take a chemical

breath test, which refusal resulted in revocation of his driver's
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license.

Green asserted that the exclusionary rule should apply

on review of the revocation.

The court characterized its review

of revocation for failure to take the breath test as judicial
review of an administrative decision, which is a civil
proceeding, and "not subject to the rules of evidence in criminal
cases."

_Id. at 820,

The court adopted the reasoning of an Iowa

decision, which concluded that "the improbable deterrent effect
of applying the rule in license revocation proceedings, when
weighed against the loss of reliable and relevant proof . . .
necessitated a finding that the exclusionary rule was
inapplicable in the license revocation proceeding-"

Id. at 820

(citing Westendorf v. Iowa Dept of Transportation, 400 N.W.2d
553, 557 (Iowa 1987)).

The Westendorf court had refused to

extend the use of the exclusionary rule formulated under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution to the use of evidence in an administrative action
revoking a driver's license. Westendorf, 400 N.W.2d at 556.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Delguidice v. New
Jersey Racing Commission, 100 N.J 79, 494 A.2d 1007 (1985), was
called upon to determine whether the New Jersey Racing
Commission, in a jockey licensing hearing, could consider
evidence obtained by law enforcement officers through illegal
means.

The court determined that a finding of entrapment and

resulting dismissal of criminal proceedings against a jockey did
not prevent use of incriminating evidence in the jockey's
licensing hearing before the Racing Commission.

The court began

with the proposition that "in an administrative hearing, unlike a

criminal trial, all relevant evidence is admissible . . . . This
difference is explained in part by the varying goaLs of the two
proceedings:

whereas the former is penal, the latter is

regulatory,"

id. at 1009-

The court utilized the reasoning and

balancing test of Janis and Lopez-Mendoza and determined that
"the deterrent effect of excluding evidence is highly attenuated
when the entity forbidden from using the evidence is not the same
entity whose agents engaged in the illegal maneuvers."
Delquidice, 494 A.2d at 1011.

The court pointed oat that the law

enforcement agents had already been deterred from committing
future acts of entrapment by reason of the dismissal of the
criminal indictments, and "[t]hat result has to be of substantial
concern to the police.

Extending the exclusionary sanction to

the subsequent licensing proceeding would have, at best, only a
marginal deterrent effect."

jEd. at 1101.

Exclusion of evidence by the Commission would not deter
county and other law enforcement agencies from Fourth Amendment
violations.

Their primary goal is arrest and prosecution for

violation of criminal statutes.
have significant social costs.

Application of the rule would
Barred evidence of drugs and drug

sales that escape taxation leaves the community to bear the
enormous burdens and costs of the social ills they cause.
Administrative hearings before the Commission would become
cumbersome.

Additional costs, time requirements, and hearings

would be required to resolve the issue of admissibility.

Direct

judicial review by this Court would be required whenever an
alleged violation of the rule is appealed.
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Thus balancing of

interests clearly weighs in favor of not extending the
exclusi on.ai:y i : i :i ] e t<: • adin i i i i s11:ati ve tax proceedings.

utah Code A n n . § 59-19-105(6) (Supp. 1990)
Which Provides For a Sharing of Tax
Collection Revenues Became Effective
April 2 4 , 1989, and Therefore Does Not
Apply Here,

c#

Petitioner a.-or^? "hat in li^uu of UtcJi 'V^k- Ay*
] 9- 105 (•

^nnn. "

i

.cation of the excl usif:i]<.;:\ - - • :< :

Li

this case wouU; indeed fulfil, the deterrence goal.
Il:i ::i ef a

'

*• 59 •

. ^ . .-

Petitioner's

s unavailable here.

Section V- : - r' , r"* provides that the Commission sha]1
— collect <iJ 1 taxes due under the Act (whether characterized as

revenues shall ultimately be distributed \ o the enforcement
agency for use in the continued enforcement of controlled
si ibstaii.ee laws .

However, this sharing provision was added to § 59-19I W J D V the 1989 legislature.
July
occurred.

i\\

The amendment w a s not effective on

-;:.- • ' :\ seizure • : cocaine and marijuai la
The taxes assessed became due and payable on August

29, 1988. Subsection (6) of § 59-19-105 became effective on
April

... • ^, many months after the assessment on the

controlled substances was made.
- -.-. • <-

'

i.ne legislating.

.•'<'•-•

A statute has retroactive

'-;.•-".••. 1 -.;.'. ;

:

:or. I at •« > t':< as retroacti ve by

Utah COC.- A;U ; . <-, <>8-i~.- ; 1^ ^6) states:

"No

part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly

Any tax revenues resulting from the Stamp Act's
imposition prior to April 24, 1989, were not shared with any
enforcement agency pursuant to the statutory scheme.

When the

seizure and arrest were made in this case, there could have been
no contemplation in the arresting officers' minds of any monetary
benefit to the arresting agency or officer resulting from a
possible tax assessment.
that time.

The sharing provision did not exist at

The officers' primary zone of interest was strictly

criminal, and did not include a potential civil tax assessment*
Therefore, the "deterrence" rationale, upon which the
exclusionary rule is based, would have no application to the
officers here.

Although this argument may arise in a future
3
case, it cannot be considered here.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Court should
affirm the decision of the Tax Commission.
Alternatively, if the Court decides that the
exclusionary rule applies in a drug stamp tax proceeding before

3
In the event that this Court decides that the rule should be
applied to a Tax Commission proceeding because of the deterrent
effect on improper police conduct, it should modify the rule's
effect. The rule acts as a prophylactic to deter future improper
police conduct. See Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454. It punishes the
offending agency. If all evidence is suppressed in the Tax
Commission proceeding, that purpose will not be fulfilled. The
Tax Commission, a non-offending agency, will also be punished in
a draconian manner; the evidence supporting its case will
disappear.
-20-

the Commission, the case should be remanded to the Commission for
t\
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Corit
The proper remedial measure would be to bar the
offending agency from sharing in the proceeds. Hence, the
prophylactic purpose of the rule would be sustained. The
offending agency would be barred from reaping the benefits of its
improper conduct. The non-offending agency, the Tax Commission,
could then be allowed to proceed without the confines of the
rule. This would satisfy the rule and be consistent with the
mandates of the legislature contained within the Illegal Drug
Stamp Act, specifying the distribution of proceeds: "If no law
enforcement agency is involved in the collection of a specific
amount under this chapter, the entire amount collected shall be
applied under Subsection (6)(a)(i) to administrative costs of

